Morality and Transcendent Reality

When faced with the fact that there is no universal or self-evident morality, there are a number of ways in which some people will try to establish morality on a merely secular basis.  I will argue that all these attempts fail to provide any sound basis for morality. In order to establish a sound basis for morality, it is necessary to appeal to some kind of transcendent reality.  

Morality and Biology

One way to attempt to establish morality on a secular basis is to ground it in human biological instincts.  Research shows that traits such as empathy, compassion, a desire for fairness, and an instinct of cooperation are biologically wired into human beings.  We can see some of these instincts displayed even in non-human animals. These traits evolved because they help individuals work together for the common good of the species, which helps to ensure the species’s survival.  Thus, some argue, there is no need to appeal to a transcendent basis for morality, since it already exists in our biological wiring.

The problem with this argument is that just because we have a biological instinct does not mean that following that instinct is reasonable and good.  Our biological instincts are often wrong and irrational.^[1]It is somewhat amusing to see popular-level atheist writings repeatedly argue that human religiosity is bogus because it is a product of the process of evolution, and then turn right around and argue … Continue reading Human beings may be biologically wired to have the traits of empathy and compassion, but they also are biologically wired to have the traits of selfishness and cruelty.  In order to say that altruism and compassion are objectively better than selfishness and cruelty, one must appeal to something other than our biological instincts, since, from an empirical standpoint, all of these traits are equally “natural.”  

Someone might object at this point that it is obvious that the biological instinct for compassion is better or more fundamental than the biological instinct for cruelty.  But for many people and societies, this is not at all “obvious.” The ancient Romans forced slaves to slaughter each other in the gladiator arenas for the amusement of massive crowds, and their whole civilization thought that this was good entertainment.  Adults who think it obvious that altruism and compassion are more fundamental to human nature than selfishness and cruelty seem to forget just how much effort every parent must put in to teach their children these values from the earliest age. Every human being’s moral instincts have already been shaped by social conditioning from a very young age to make them less selfish and more civilized than they naturally are.

One can then argue that we can distinguish between those biological instincts that are moral and those that are immoral based on what is most beneficial for the survival of the species.  There are several problems with this argument. First, it is not at all self-evident that the survival of the human species is objectively better than its destruction. Why is it objectively the case that an individual should care about the rest of their species?  And even if they do care, why should they care about what will happen to the human species after they are dead and gone and will not be around to see it? Second, if species can evolve into other species, then it is not at all clear that the survival of the human species is really meaningful, since it could eventually evolve into a completely different species.  Third, even if one could establish that the continued existence of our species is somehow a self-evident value, the morality that could be established on this basis would be so flimsy as to be almost meaningless. It would take quite a lot of destruction to threaten the existence of the human species. If morality merely means doing what will ensure the survival of the human species, then any amount of torture, rape, and even mass murder could be morally justified as long as it does not threaten humanity with extinction.  

Morality and Society

If human biology cannot provide any sound basis for morality, then some turn to human society as the basis for morality.  If there is no truly objective, universal morality, some argue, we can still define morality in terms of what is beneficial to human society.  If everyone treats each other with kindness, fairness, and justice, we will all be better off overall; thus, it can be in our own best interest to treat others well.  This can provide, some argue, a basis for morality that is merely secular and does not require reference to any transcendent reality.

The problem with defining morality merely in terms of the functioning of human society is that the functioning of human society does not require that every individual always act in a just and fair manner; it only requires that most individuals act in a just and fair manner most of the time.  An individual member of a human society can live their entire life in a selfish manner, while benefiting from the altruism of others, without ever threatening the functioning of the society which benefits them. If morality is defined merely as what allows for the functioning of human society, then that entire life of selfishness cannot be condemned as immoral.  

A possible response to this is to say that each individual should act in a way that would be reasonable if every individual acted in that way; if every individual were selfish, human society would collapse, and so each individual member of a society, if they want to benefit from the continued existence of that society, should act in a just and fair manner.  But this response merely begs the question and assumes what it is trying to prove: that selfishness is morally wrong. It is perfectly possible for an individual to be a hypocrite and to manipulate and influence others to be selfless, while at the same, perhaps secretly, living a completely selfish life. If morality is merely defined in terms of the functioning of human society, then this entire life of selfishness and hypocrisy cannot logically be labeled as immoral.  Thus, the functioning of society provides no sound basis for morality.  

Morality and Emotions

A final attempt at a secular account of morality is emotivism, the ethical theory that regards ethical judgments as merely expressions of emotion.  As a description of moral beliefs, this theory is manifestly false. The statement, “This is morally wrong,” does not have the same meaning as the statement, “This makes me feel bad”; the first statement is a claim about objective reality, while the second statement is a claim about one’s subjective feelings.  But if emotivism is taken prescriptively, it logically would lead to an abandonment of all moral beliefs. If ethical judgments are really nothing but expressions of emotion, then statements such as “This is morally wrong” are meaningless, and if we want to communicate clearly and accurately, we should always replace such statements with statements about our emotions.  But this is the same thing as saying that there is no moral truth at all. Emotivism does not provide an explanation of morality; it explains it away as meaningless.

Morality and Transcendent Reality

Morality is not self-evident, nor is there a sound basis for it in human biology, society, or emotions.  In fact, there is no coherent secular account of morality. Any coherent account of morality requires an appeal to some kind of transcendent reality.

Claims about moral truth are claims that things in our world objectively ought to be different than they actually are.  This begs the question, “Why? Why is it objectively true that things ought to be different?” Our own subjective feelings, desires, and intuitions do not provide a sufficient answer to this question.  In order to provide a coherent and adequate answer to this question, there must be reference to some kind of transcendent reality that can provide an objective standard for judging whether things are in fact good or bad, right or wrong.  This could be, for example, the will of a deity, a nontheistic religious concept like karma or nirvana, or a philosophical metaphysical concept such as Plato’s or Aristotle’s theories of the Forms. Whatever it may be, a reference to some kind of transcendent, metaphysical reality is needed in order to provide a sound basis for morality.