Previously on this blog, I have made the case for the importance of virtue ethics. I have argued that it is inadequate to think of ethics solely in terms of following a list of rules, or solely in terms of “the ends justify the means.” Rather, we must think of ethics in terms of developing morally good character traits (virtues) and ridding ourselves of morally bad character traits (vices). According to virtue ethics, we should not just accept what people are like and then try to enact policies that will make these people as happy as is practicable. Rather, people must strive to change their character traits so that they will conform to an objective standard of virtue, and it is in doing so that true “happiness” (an objective state of human flourishing) is obtained.
There is a tension between this understanding of ethics and modern therapeutic psychology. Modern therapeutic psychology seeks to relieve psychological distress. It seeks to make people feel good about themselves and to accept themselves as they are. Rather than telling people that they need to change in order to conform to an objective standard external to themselves, modern therapeutic psychology seeks to help the individual subjectively feel psychological wholeness and absence of psychological distress. While virtue ethics and psychology do not directly contradict one another, they do often seem to be at cross purposes in terms of offering rival narratives about how to achieve human flourishing.
This tension between virtue ethics and psychology is particularly highlighted when one considers the issue of psychological disorders. A person suffering from a psychological disorder may have abnormal thought and behavior patterns that seem to be out of their control. The goal of the psychologist when dealing with such an individual will be to try to help them mitigate the harmful effects the psychological disorder is having on them. The psychologist will typically recommend whatever course of action will be best for that individual in terms of helping them to relieve their psychological distress. But this runs counter to a virtue ethics framework, in which all human beings are supposed to change their character in order to conform to an objective standard of human virtue, regardless of how difficult this process is.
Thus, some proponents of virtue ethics are dismissive of the whole field of modern psychology and therapy, seeing it as morally bankrupt. They would tell someone who claims to be suffering from a psychological disorder to grow up, take moral responsibility for their actions, and become more virtuous. While there is some truth in this critique of modern therapeutic psychology, it seems to not take seriously enough the reality of serious psychological disorders, the intense psychological distress experienced by those suffering from them, and the extreme difficulty in eliminating psychological disorders that sometimes exists.
Virtue ethics must take account of the reality of psychological disorders. Yet it seems difficult for this ethical framework to do so. If virtue ethics says that human beings are supposed to develop a certain character trait, but someone has a psychological disorder that makes this literally impossible, what then?
The only answer seems to be that this individual is incapable of becoming truly virtuous. They are incapable of becoming truly morally good. But this answer seems difficult to accept. It seems problematic to tell someone that they are morally responsible for doing something which is impossible for them to do. Thus, there seems to be a problem with virtue ethics.
What if, though, a person is able somehow to continue to exist beyond this life and to continue to develop their character? This is what is posited by some religious versions of virtue ethics, for example, Christian virtue ethics. In this case, even if a person is incapable of developing a certain virtue during their life due to an intractable psychological disorder, they may be able to develop that virtue in the future in a new mode of existence. If the development of virtue is not confined to this span of life, then there can be hope for anyone to eventually become virtuous, in spite of the psychological limitations they experience during this life span.
Thus, while the reality of psychological disorder seems to provide a serious problem for secular virtue ethics, this problem can be answered by other versions of virtue ethics. A serious psychological disorder may mean that one will have a limit to the development of virtue in certain respects during their lifetime. But if one takes a view of the self that surpasses the limitations of this lifespan, then one can still be committed to eventually becoming fully virtuous. Thus, a proponent of virtue ethics can be understanding of an individual’s limitations in growing in virtue in this lifetime due to a psychological disorder, without compromising their moral convictions that all human beings should strive to conform to an objective standard of virtue.